Notes

• [1]
  U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Current Energy Shortages Oversight Series, The Major Oil Companies : Hearing before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 113-114.
• [2]
  For recent examples see : Bini et al., Oil Shock: The 1973 Crisis and its Economic Legacy ; Garavini, The Rise and Fall of OPEC in the Twentieth Century ; Graf, Oil and Sovereignty: Petro-Knowledge and Energy Policy in the United States and Western Europe in the 1970s ; Jacobs, Panic at the Pump: The Energy Crisis and the Transformation of American Politics in the 1970s ; Lifset ed., American Energy Policy in the 1970s ; Wellum, Energizing Neoliberalism : The 1970s Energy Crisis and the Making of Modern America ; on the energy crisis as more than an oil crisis see Hakes, Energy Crises : Nixon, Ford, Carter and Hard Choices in the 1970s ; and Lifset, “A New Understanding of the American Energy Crisis of the 1970s”.
• [3]
  See Sampson, The Seven Sisters : The Great Oil Companies and the World They Made ; Yergin ; The Prize : The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power, 513.
• [4]
  The application of anti-trust laws were uneven as some majors successfully operated in the oil patch through companies with different names and some independents grew to become majors. See Pratt, “The Petroleum Industry in Transition : Antitrust and the Decline of Monopoly Control in Oil” ; Singer, Broken Trusts : The Texas Attorney General Versus The Oil Industry, 1889-1909.
• [5]
  The Roosevelt administration briefly thought about a state-owned Petroleum Reserve Corporation which would buy options on foreign oil produced by American firms. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes even imagined that it would acquire managerial control of foreign operating companies (i.e. ARAMCO). See Randall, “Harold Ickes and United States Foreign Petroleum Policy Planning, 1939-1945” ; Stoff, Oil, War, and American Security, 73-88.
• [6]
  Dochuk traces the connections between the majors, Arabists and the Department of State and CIA. See Dochuk, Anointed With Oil : How Christianity and Crude Made Modern America, 301. See also Vitalis, America’s Kingdom: Mythmaking On The Saudi Oil Frontier ; and Painter, Private Power And Public Policy : Multinational Oil Corporations And U.S. Foreign Policy 1941-1954.
• [7]
  It should be noted that California was cut off by the Rocky Mountains from midwestern and east coast markets, and yet it was the largest oil producing state from 1914 to 1936 and the largest consumer of primary petroleum products until 1968. Independent oil companies in California emerged without anti-trust protection and were opposed to prorationing throughout the 1930s. California’s isolation produced a different set of economic and political conditions. See Sabin, Crude Politics : The California Oil Market 1900-1940.
• [8]
  In the 21^st century the largest oil companies by almost any measurably metric are state owned.
• [9]
  “Blow Aimed at Majors Hurt Independents, Too”.
• [10]
  Lemann, “Independent Oilman : Why They Take the Risks”.
• [11]
  Nash, United States Oil Policy, 1890-1964, 113-156 ; While the opposition to pro-rationing was led by independents so was the effort to realize pro-ratioing. Wirt Franklin, President of the IPAA supported pro-rationing. E.W. Marland, a former independent oil man and member of Congress in the early 1930s supported pro-rationing ; there was a deep bench of independents leading the pro-rationing effort. John Clark writes, “a large group of independents, termed the ‘majority independents’ by Rene de V. Williamson and best represented by the Independent Petroleum Association of America (IPAA), actively supported Icke’s campaign for direct federal controls”. Clark, Energy and the Federal Government: Fossil Fuel Policies, 1900-1946, 223.
• [12]
  Vietor, Energy Policy in America Since 1945, 91-135.
• [13]
  Waterhouse, “Mobilizing for the Market : Organized Business, Wage-Price Controls, and the Politics of Inflation, 1971-1974” ; there is a longer, more complicated story on how and why the federal government placed price controls on natural gas. See Blanchard, The Extraction State, 103-171.
• [14]
  See Malavis, Bless the Pure and Humble: Texas Lawyers and Oil Regulation, 1919-1936.
• [15]
  See Hinton and Olien, Oil In Texas : The Gusher Age, 1895-1945 ; Hinton and Olien, Wildcatters: Texas Independent Oilmen.
• [16]
  Lemann.
• [17]
  In the 1970s these issues included the Natural Gas Policy Act (1978), repeal of the depletion allowance, and legislative proposals to eliminate the lease lottery system and replace it with competitive bidding for leases on federal land among others.
• [18]
  Gouldy, “Reno” 8.
• [19]
  US oil companies gained the ability to deduct fifty percent of their foreign taxes from their US tax liabilities. See Blair, The Control of Oil, 193-204.
• [20]
  U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Current Energy Shortages Oversight Series, 142.
• [21]
  Smith, “Angered Oil Men Dispute Charges of Senate Critics”.
• [22]
  According to Jackson’s biographer, this strategy backfired see Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics, 308.
• [23]
  The credit allowed all foreign taxes paid by the industry to be credited against US taxes owed. Nixon, “Special Message to the Congress on the Energy Crisis”, 27 ; on the depletion allowance see Shulman, “The Making of a Tax Break : The Oil Depletion Allowance, Scientific Taxation, and Natural Resources Policy in the Early 20^th Century.”
• [24]
  This pollution did not go unnoticed in the past. See Pratt, Black Waters : Responses to America’s First Oil Pollution Crisis.
• [25]
  Carson, Silent Spring ; Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth : A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind ; there is a large scholarship on the emergence of environmentalism, for one example see Lifset, Storm King Mountain and The Emergence of Modern American Environmentalism.
• [26]
  See Spezio, Slick Policy : Environmental and Science Policy in the Aftermath of the Santa Barbara Oil Spill.
• [27]
  “Cities : the price of optimism”.
• [28]
  Galbraith, The Affluent Society, 253 ; for greater context see Rome, “Give Earth a Chance” : The Environmental Movement and the Sixties”.
• [29]
  See Rome, The Genius of Earth Day : How a 1970 Teach-In Unexpectedly Made the First Green Generation.
• [30]
  The Graduate, directed by Mike Nichols (United Artists, 1967).
• [31]
  “‘Floated To Victory On A Wave Of Oil’” ; Yergin, 183, 328-88.
• [32]
  Nivola, The Politics of Energy Conservation, 35-36 ; the idea that the energy crisis was the result, in part, of an industry conspiracy has a long history. For example see Mitchell, Carbon Democracy : Political Power In The Age of Oil ; for a polemic on how a moral critique levelled at the Standard Oil Company, survived its dissolution in 1911 and came to be applied to the entire industry see Olien et al., Oil & Ideology: The Cultural Creation of the American Petroleum Industry.
• [33]
  For a history of the peak oil debate see Priest, “Hubbert’s Peak : The Great Debate over the End of Oil”.
• [34]
  Central Intelligence Agency, “The Impending Soviet Oil Crisis” March 1977, April 1977, PHF, Box 19, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library ; Hakes, Energy Crises, 211.
• [35]
  See Lutz, “The Formula (1980) : Corporate Villains, Synthetic Fuel, and Environmental Fantasies”, 243-256.
• [36]
  See generally, Bamberg, British Petroleum and Global Oil, 1950-1975 : The Challenge of Nationalism ; Wall, Growth in a Changing Environment : A History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) Exxon Corporation 1950-1975, 812-894.
• [37]
  See Dewey, Don’t Breadth the Air: Air Pollution and US Environmental Politics, 1945-1970.
• [38]
  See Milazzo, Unlikely Environmentalists : Congress and Clean Water, 1945-1972.
• [39]
  Lifset, “‘Lord, We Don’t Want to Hurt People,’ The Decline and Fall of the American Electric Utility Industry in the 1970s”, 469-471.
• [40]
  See U.S. Congress, Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee on The Economic Impact of Environmental Regulations, 46.
• [41]
  While this was a common argument at the time, historians have since demonstrated that the original designs did not to take into account the challenges of moving oil through an arctic environment. See Coates, The Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Controversy: Technology, Conservation, and the Frontier.
• [42]
  Pratt, Exxon: Transforming Energy, 1973-2005, 167-168.
• [43]
  Sluyterman, Keeping Competitive in Turbulent Markets, 1973-2007: A History of Royal Dutch Shell, 155.
• [44]
  “Oklahoma’s State In Energy” Speech of Robert E. Thomas, Chairman and President, MAPCO Inc., 14 May 1975, Oklahoma Bankers Association, RD 8-T-5-5 Box 2 Folder 1, Boren Papers.
• [45]
  This was a view increasingly echoed by oil patch politicians. Governor Edwin Edwards (D-LA) opened a special session of the Louisiana legislature in November 1973 with an attack on the east : “They cannot sit on five billion barrels of oil on the Atlantic Seaboard because they are afraid it might cause some problems on the shoreline, and gleefully applaud while we puncture holes in the Gulf of Mexico and lace our fertile lands with pipelines to bring them oil.” Time would reveal that this assumption was erroneous. Yet there exists a clear subtext to many of these complaints : the environment of the oil patch is being sacrificed for the benefit of consumers in the east. Bob Hamm, “We must now look to the good state of Lousiana”, 14
• [46]
  Ibid.
• [47]
  Childress, “Horace Spiller Industry Pioneer”, 52.
• [48]
  Paul H. Stark to David Boren, 27 March 1978, RG-8-T- 11-3 Box 1, File 8, Boren Papers.
• [49]
  John H. Case to David Boren, 18 February 1977, 8-T-11-4 Box 2 Folder 3, Boren Papers.
• [50]
  Gouldy, “Instant Wilderness”, 23.
• [51]
  Lemann.
• [52]
  U.S. Congress, House of Represenatives, Committee on Apropriations, Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Department of the Interior, 124.
• [53]
  All of these examples are anecdotal. I have found no evidence of the IPAA directly attacking environmental legislation. When IPAA officials testified before Congress they refrained from blaming environmentalists for the energy crisis. In the 1970s, the IPAA focused on eliminating price controls on oil and natural gas. There is evidence of state chapters, such as the Oklahoma Independent Petroleum Association, voicing opposition to new environmental regulations. See for example, “Group Brands Oil Spill Rules As Stringent”.
• [54]
  A Time To Choose : America’s Energy Future ; Final Report.
• [55]
  A Time to Choose: America’s Energy Future, Petroleum Independent, 40.
• [56]
  “Exxon and the Environment”, December 1975, Series D, Box 52, Folder : Energy, National Audubon Society Records, New York Public Library.
• [57]
  Davis, D.K., “Opening Statement by D.K. Davis to Jimmy Carter for President, Energy Conference,” Carlton Neville Papers, Box 45, Folder : Transition Planning- Energy, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, 2.
• [58]
  On how the Republican Party in the south was bankrolled in the middle decades of the twentieth century with independent oil money see Burrough, The Big Rich: The Rise And Fall Of The Greatest Texas Oil Fortunes.
• [59]
  Jacobs, Panic at the Pump, 6-10.
• [60]
  This was an argument advanced by Ronald Reagan. See Perlstein, The Invisible Bridge: The Fall of Nixon and the Rise of Reagan, 435-440 ; examples include the self-defeating nature of welfare and the Laffer Curve.
• [61]
  Wellum, 43 ; the anti-environmentalism of Fred Ikard and the API tended to run a bit ahead of the majors themselves.
• [62]
  Turner and Isenberg, The Republican Reversal : Conservatives and the Environment from Nixon to Trump, 36-48.
• [63]
  For many environmentalists, this has already happened. See Mark, “Abolish Fossil Fuels : A moral Case for ending the age of coal, oil, and gas” 20-25.