Introduction

1  The German Democratic Republic is an interesting but marginally studied country in research on energy crises and energy transitions in historical perspective. [1] East Germany faced several energy crises until its fall in 1990, including the two energy shocks of the 1970s. However, what makes the GDR a special subject in the context of the European “Short Coal Age” [2] is that its birth in the post-World War II era coincided with a period of disruption in hard coal supplies. [3] Hard coal and lignite remained dominant energy sources in the GDR not only until the 1960s but throughout the state’s lifetime.

2  Industrial sectors in areas of the future GDR used different types of coal throughout the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. Before World War II, hard coal imported from mines in the western part of Germany was used for electricity production and for synthetic oil production. After 1939, the war industry increasingly relied not only on hard but also on brown coal from the mines in what at the time was known as Central Germany. After the war, the whole economic, industrial and production system was in shambles. Coal deliveries from Western to Eastern Germany ceased. The Soviets, who occupied and governed Eastern Germany, thus found themselves without traditional energy sources to support the territory’s economic recovery. While local lignite mining was seen to have great potential, industrial plants in the Soviet Occupation Zone were originally reliant on hard coal and were not yet adapted to lignite. However, in the manoeuvres taken for overcoming this crisis, as well as later ones, domestic lignite (brown coal) became central in the GDR’s energy strategy. In contrast to other countries where coal shortages spurred a shift toward a new “hybrid” energy system already from the 1950s, [4] the GDR did not experience such a strong implementation of oil in its energy balance, with brown coal remaining the preeminent energy source until the country’s collapse. How was this possible? Why did coal remain the dominant source in the energy mix of East Germany in the post-war period, while in other countries this era coincided with the beginning of what is commonly referred to as the energy transition to oil?

3 A few scholars have analysed the East German energy system. Although many of those studies date back to the Cold War period, they remain crucial to understand the general development of the East German energy sector. [5] Contemporary analyses, for their part, employ either a comparative approach with West German policies or a lens focused on the energy crises of the 1970s. [6] These approaches offer a limited perspective on the dynamics underlying the peculiarities of the birth and expansion of the East German energy system in the first, critical decades.

4  The roots of the East-German “Long Coal Age” can be found in the first years of the GDR’s existence and in the use of brown coal for overcoming the post-war shortage of hard coal. By exploring the first decades of the communist experiment in East Germany, this article addresses the gap in the literature mentioned above and aims to clarify the reasons behind the prolonged implementation of a coal-based energy policy even after the hard coal shortage. It shows how the GDR in the aftermath of World War II switched from West German hard coal (from the Ruhr) to local lignite. The examination of the measures employed by the GDR in response to the postwar crisis offers insights into the factors that led to the distinct development of the energy sector in East Germany compared to other nations. I argue that the protracted endurance of coal can be ascribed to two factors. First, the absence of available capital inhibited the possibility of adapting existing plants or building new ones – although there were attempts, for example, with hydrocarbons. This dynamic led to a perpetual state of technological obsolescence. Secondly, East Germany prioritized energy independence from external markets. In order to reduce its reliance on imported fuels and expenditure on imports, the GDR pursued a strategy of associating the energy and industrial sectors with a strong reliance on domestic resources. This approach emerged in the 1950s and 1960s and was further strengthened in the 1970s and 1980s.

The East German coal industry before, during and after the war

5  Coal in general, but domestic lignite in particular, played a crucial role in the economy of the Weimar Republic. For some production processes, like in water, gas and power plants, lignite was used instead of hard coal, while in other sectors hard coal was preferred. [7] In the 1920s and 1930s, German scientists developed processes that enabled the use of domestic coal in lieu of imported oil for the synthesis of petroleum products. Of the two processes invented and used by different companies (hydrogenation and the Fischer-Tropsch process), hydrogenation [8] proved to be the more advantageous because it used lignite, a young coal that reacted more readily than hard coal. [9] The brown coal, unlike other fuels, could be mined in several fields close to industrial zones, especially in the districts of Thuringia, Saxony and Lusatia. [10] These areas had developed chemical and fuel plants, electrical and mechanical engineering companies. [11] Indeed, during the 1930s about 30% of the Third Reich’s industrial production came from the future GDR’s territory. [12] (Graph 1)

Graph 1: Lignite production in the Third German Reich by region in million tonnes.

Description

Mio t.




 1936 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
Years
Central Germany East Germany Rheinland

Graph 1: Lignite production in the Third German Reich by region in million tonnes.

6  The different distribution of raw materials and industrial plants permitted a stable exchange of fuels and goods with the western part of Germany. The eastern regions “exported” agricultural products, lignite or industrial goods to the west, while the western regions provided heavy machinery, iron and steel, and hard coal from the Ruhr and the Saar to the east. [13]

7  During the Nazi period, the industrial apparatus changed. The Nazis invested great efforts from 1936 on developing coal-based petrochemical industry and on brown coal mining, overall, in the Reich. [14] The importance of lignite in the war industry increased even more during World War II. [15]

8  The whole energy structure changed radically after the war’s end. The former Third Reich was divided into four occupation zones, while some areas were annexed by other states or were made independent. Many energy facilities were destroyed or over-exploited during the war.

9  The Potsdam Conference, where the leaders of the Soviet Union, Britain and United States met in July 1945, prohibited synthetic fuel production in Germany. The Allies argued that the Nazis developed the synthetic fuel industry for strategic self-sufficiency. Thus, coal hydrogenation plants were dismantled at least in the Western Zones. The Soviet administration acted differently: the most significant coal hydrogenation plants continued to produce refined petroleum until the early 1960s. [16] However, there were many obstacles to the economic and energy sector’s recovery in Eastern Germany, including the rel atively low availability of primary energy sources as well as technical obsolescence and natural obstacles.

10 Even though at the end of the war the areas of the future GDR yielded 100% of lignite produced in the Reich (60% of German lignite was produced in mines in Lower Lusatia, 20% in Borna and 20% in Halle), the capacity of brown coal mines was reduced after the war. The lignite output registered in 1943 amounted to about 165 Mio t. That level was reached again only 10 years later. By 1947, the mines were required to be dismantled, resulting in the loss of over a third of the 1943 capacity in a short period. [17] Moreover, the Soviet Occupation Zone was left with only 3% of national hard coal mining (in Saxony and Brandenburg). [18] Simultaneously, the restrictive allied regulations drastically reduced the inter-regional hard coal trade. As Steiner reports, the western exports covered only 15-16% of the total eastern needs of hard coal, which amounted to about 13-14 Mio t. Domestic pro duction covered only 0.02% of hard coal needs, while another 0.06% came from Upper Silesia in what was now Poland. [19] In this particular instance, at the end of 1945, the Soviet occu pational authorities entered into a contractual agreement with Poland for the provision of hard coal and coke. [20]

11  Furthermore, the government had to contend with a greatly damaged energy-industrial apparatus. The energy plants and machinery were the most damaged by the war. 18% of all power plants and 75% of the mechanical engineering had been destroyed in the war. Many plants had become obsolete: previously dedicated to civilian tasks, during the war they had been transferred to military production. Following the indication of the Potsdam Agreement on reparations, [21] the new Soviet authorities dismantled several lignite plants as well as a number of refining and power plants, and sent to the Soviet Union some industrial plants as war reparations. [22] In June 1946, the Soviets initiated the first wave of expropriation, which resulted in the acquisition of energy plants and their subsequent transformation into joint-stock companies. [23] Among these was the Leuna plant, which had initiated the production of petrol and diesel from coal in the aftermath of World War I. [24] The massive reparation expropriations in the energy sector meant that Soviet joint stock companies and state-owned companies handled 92.6% of energy production already in 1947. [25]

12  While dismantling and expropriating numerous plants, the Soviet administration introduced a planned economic model in its occupation zone. It sought to re-equip energy facilities and expand the domestic energy base in order to revitalize the national economy. Overall, the reopening of the brown coal mines and finding new hard coal supplies were fundamental for the reconstruction of East Germany’s industrial apparatus. The Soviets defined fuel production and power plants as priorities for late 1945. In particular, the Soviet Administration planned to increase fuel and energy production to cover energy demand and to ensure a continuous supply of electrical energy. [26] In 1946 new measures for the extraction of brown coal were taken, among them the construction of 13 open-pit mines. [27] In 1947, then, the Soviets presented a more focused policy on investments in the energy sector. They set up the German Economic Commission, whose department “Coal and Energy” was responsible for decisions in energy policy. [28] Soon, the Commission drafted a “General Plan”, which aimed to overcome the shortage of fuels by restoring coal mining, briquette factories and the transportation system. The Soviets decreed the establishment of 8 public companies in the lignite mining industry and one in the area of hard coal. [29]

Energy in the 1950s: giving place to oil

13 The establishment of the German Democratic Republic in 1949 and the strengthening of ties with other Eastern countries marked the advent of a new era. The regeneration of the industrial and economic sector was seen to be of paramount importance in this context, as it was linked to the goal of restoring peace and prosperity in the country and with the aim of being recognized as a sovereign state. The energy industry, which constituted the starting point for this restoration, became the most important focus of investment planning during the initial Two-Year Plan (1949/50) and the first Five-Year Plan (1951/55), in combination with heavy industry.

14  At that time, brown coal had become one of the most important East German outputs. The GDR had likely become the world’s foremost lignite producer. Lignite, the sole domestic fuel, was employed for a multitude of purposes. A portion of this lignite was exported. Domestically, it was used for the synthesis of chemicals and the manufacture of briquettes. [30] Moreover, a significant aspect of the Two-Year Plan was the growth in electricity generation based on brown coal. With the enactment of the Energy Industry Ordinance in June 1949, the electricity industry underwent a more centralized and rigorous reorganization. [31] The government designated electric power engineering as a priority area for investment. This led to the reconstruction of some electricity networks and a notable increase in funding for the engineering office, particularly for turbines and generators. [32] In comparison with the data from 1936, in 1950 the production of brown coal had increased by 38%, that of briquettes by 9% and the gross production of electricity by approximately 3%. [33] This aspect of the energy sector was of particular significance, not only due to the necessity of meeting domestic demands, but also because it constituted a component of a broader network of exchange with foreign nations, including those in the West. Among the latter were customers in West Germany. For instance, an agreement was reached with Licht- und Kraftwerke GmbH Harz (Likra), a West German utility, in 1949 for the supply of electricity from the east, which remained in place until the 1960s. [34]

15 Although the initial crisis appeared to be stabilizing, the GDR continued to experience a shortage of electricity, [35] which impeded the smooth functioning of the industrial sector. As Johannes Bähr has emphasized, the investments planned in the Two-Year-Plan were primarily directed towards power plants and engineering, yet the overall industrial system remained outdated, including energy-intensive industries such as the chemical industry. The situation remained tense due to the loss of over 50% of primary energy during the conversion process, which was caused by the technological backwardness of the machinery and power plant construction. [36] This situation was caused by a number of factors. One had to do with the “energy autarky” course. This policy forced an almost exclusive orientation towards lignite and thus towards an inefficient primary energy source. Another factor was a focus on short-term production planning combined with a shortage of semi-finished goods and raw materials. A third factor was linked to a lack of innovation in energy technology and the neglect of research and development. Furthermore, the technical systems were particularly prone to malfunctions due to their intricate complexity. [37] As a consequence, a shortage of energy emerged within the wider East German society. In order to make electricity available to everyone, the German Economic Commission implemented a system of energy rationing. [38]

16 Following the admission of the GDR to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) [39] in 1950, the necessity of cooperation within the Eastern Bloc increased. The collaboration with other Eastern countries became a defining feature of the subsequent plans for the development of the economic and energy apparatus of East Germany. Like other Communist regimes, the governing party of the GDR – the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) – managed the national economy through multi-year plans. In the initial planning stages of the First Five-Year Plan, the SED sought to prioritize the development of heavy industry, fuel and power, the metallurgical industry, steel works and rolling mills, and mechanical engineering. [40] The relatively developed chemical industry based on brown coal [41] did not receive substantial funding for expansion investments until 1953-1955. [42] However, the government took measures to improve the country’s fuel supply. It opened new mines of brown coal and initiated new projects for the production of coke from lignite. [43] Another strategy deployed was the importation of energy sources from abroad, particularly from Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. However, from the outset, these imports were marked by delays and deficiencies. [44]

17 Despite a production capacity that had more than doubled since 1936, electricity remained insufficient to meet the demand, as there were continued limitations in the allocation of resources to the basic materials industry. [45] By 1952, it was evident that the GDR was unable to accomplish all economic objectives while allocating sufficient resources to reparations, rearmament, the development of primary and heavy industry, and the strengthening of the state’s reserve. The situation further deteriorated when the SED’s chief Walter Ulbricht proclaimed “planned construction of socialism” at the Second Party Conference in 1952. This decision implied promotion of heavy industry at the expense of other sectors. The intensification of production activities necessitated an influx of energy and raw materials, which the GDR was unable to provide.

18 The “New Course” of 1953 represented a shift in policy that acknowledged the shortcomings of the previous approach and initiated a transition in economic strategy. This entailed a reallocation of resources, with a shift from investment in heavy industry to the expansion of consumer goods production.

19 The discrepancy between the rising demand for energy and the actual production capacity resulted in the formulation of a revised Coal and Energy Program. In 1954, a group of state-owned enterprises, (VEB) Energieversorgung, was established with the objective of overseeing the production, transmission and distribution of electricity across all regions. Concurrently, a new plan for the development of coal production was devised. [46] The program resulted in a 39.5% increase in the proportion of investment allocated to industrial branches of the energy sector. This development also marked the advent of a new phase of growth for basic industry. In 1955, the chemical industry itself centralized 14.4% of investment in this sector. [47]

20  Additionally, the Program benefited from certain concessions made by the Soviet Union. The USSR consented to the remission of a portion of the East German debt, a reduction in its reparation demands, and the delivery of greater quantities of coke, iron and grain. Furthermore, the Kremlin extended a credit of approximately half a billion roubles to the GDR and transferred 33 Soviet joint-stock companies to East Germany. Among these were several power plants and chemical industries, such as Leuna in Halle. [48] This led to a surge in capital investment in the energy sector, particularly in lignite production.

21  By the mid-1950s, the socialist planned economy had yielded notable outcomes, despite the presence of structural issues. For instance, energy production had increased in 1955 by 146% in comparison to the figures recorded in 1950. [49] Nevertheless, the elevated demand for energy continued to exceed the supply. The objectives set out in the initial Five-Year Plan, apart from those pertaining to raw brown coal production, which were met with 98% success, remained unfulfilled. For instance, the anticipated outcomes with respect to hard coal production were not met, with only 67% of the targeted production being achieved. [50] This resulted in a surge in imports of this resource, [51] which was essential for the production of gas and hydrocarbons as well as for the provision of energy in general. This influx of resources originated from a multitude of countries, including both capitalist countries such as West Germany and socialist countries in the East. [52]

22  The Second Five-Year Plan, spanning the period from 1956 to 1960, was developed at the

23 Third Party Conference of the SED. It adopted the slogan “Modernization, Mechanization, Automatization”. The draft plan proposed a doubling of investment, a more rapid growth in productivity, and the introduction of new technology. The second Five-Year Plan included, among its stated objectives, the resolution of energy-related issues pertaining to the transformation of the industrial structure and the restructuring of energy supply. The plan prioritized the development of the domestic fuel, electric power and basic chemical industries. Despite the relatively low level of power generation, an effective expansion of power plants in the GDR was feasible once more powerful turbines and generators from the GDR’s own production became available in the mid-1950s. [53] As in the former plan, however, the technological and industrial development required a further increase in energy provision, which again could not be met. In particular, the situation got worse for the GDR at the end of 1956, when the imports of coke from Poland decreased and no acceptable increase in domestic energy production was achieved. [54]

24 In light of the persistent deficiencies in the energy sector, a new program, entitled “Program on the Establishment of Perspectives and Measures for Securing the Development of the Energy Economy of the GDR”, was devised in March 1957. The implementation of the program was described as the “The most decisive economic task – the number one program for the entire national economy, to which everything else must be subordinated”. [55] The second Coal and Energy Program set forth an increase in domestic coal production of 30% by 1960 and in energy production of 33% over 1956. Subsequently, approximately one-third of industrial investment was allocated to the expansion of open pits, lignite-fired power plants and coal-processing facilities. [56] (Graph 2)

Graph 2: Investments in Industrial Sectors (In million marks, price basis 1967)

Description

Graph 2: Investments in Industrial Sectors (In million marks, price basis 1967)

25  In the context of the broader coal and energy program, the proportion of investment allocated to the energy sector increased from 41% to 45% in 1959. [57] The construction of new, large-scale power plants (Lübbenau, Schwarze Pumpe) commenced in 1957, being accompanied by a notable expansion of the lignite industry’s capacity. [58] Furthermore, the plan underscored the significance of nuclear energy development, which began in earnest through the construction of the pilot-scale Rheinsberg nuclear power plant. Additionally, during this period, in order to address the scarcity of resources, trade relations with Western countries were enhanced. Electricity imports, for example, increased more than threefold from West Germany in 1956-1959, while electricity transfers from Poland to East Germany increased by 4.7%. [59]

26  By the end of the 1950s, the energy and economic system of East Germany was undergoing a significant transformation. In November 1958, Walter Ulbricht emphasized to employees of a power plant the necessity of accelerating energy growth in excess of industrial production. Accordingly, the entire energy industry was tasked with establishing the infrastructure necessary to ensure uninterrupted electricity supply to other industrial sectors and to society at large. [60] Additionally, a portion of this production was intended for export, a strategy that would allow the country to obtain revenues and secure the necessary town gas. [61]

27 In this context, the brown coal and briquettes production, as well as the import of hard coal, proved insufficient to meet electricity demand. The GDR then turned its attention to alternative strategies. One such strategy involved the use of crude oil, imported from the USSR, in certain industrial sectors as a substitute for brown coal. Despite the continued low utilization of crude oil in electricity production, at least during the examined period, [62] its deployment in other pivotal sectors, particularly the chemical industry, was successful. Oil, unlike coal, was a less polluting and a less expensive option, although the costs associated with its extraction, transportation and processing became increasingly challenging to sustain. The principal challenge associated with the utilization of this fuel was that it had to be imported. Domestic exploration conducted during the 1950s did not yield significant oil deposits within the GDR’s territory, necessitating reliance on supplies from the USSR.

28  The Fifth Party Congress of the SED first discussed the initial implementation of this strategy of energy transition in July 1958. The congress decided to increase per capita consumption of essential consumer goods, attain a globally leading level of technology, labour productivity, and assortment by 1965. The party also identified the advancement of domestic industry as a fundamental prerequisite for the fulfilment of these objectives. The assumption behind this initiative was that, given the prevailing levels of production and the scarcity of raw materials, the acceleration of the national economy would hinge primarily on the rapid expansion of domestic supply, particularly within the chemical sector. [63]

29  The most significant transformation occurred already at a party conference held in November 1958 at the Leuna plant. The Central Committee of the SED announced a new chemical program based on the Soviet model. This program included the development of petrochemical efforts and was promoted with the slogan “Chemistry provides bread, prosperity and beauty”. The SED resolved to replace coal with oil and other energy sources, including natural gas and nuclear power, in the chemical industry. [64] The growing demand for crude oil resulted in increased investment in oil refineries and the construction of pipelines, as well as collaboration in the Comecon. The program projected building a state-owned enterprise (Combine or VEB) for the processing of crude oil in Schwedt (VEB Erdölverarbeitungswerk Schwedt), [65] the chemical fiber combine in Guben, the expansion of the Luetzkendorf refinery, the construction of the refinery plant Leuna II “Walter Ulbricht”, and the building of a pipeline from the USSR through Poland to East Germany. [66]

30 In light of Ulbricht’s ideas, the preparation of new chemical products through research and development was not solely the domain of chemists and chemical process engineers. It held equal significance for the processing and application industries, which, as stewards of the supply chain, were duty-bound to safeguard the interests of consumers of the final products. Furthermore, it was a concern for raw material producers, as well as mechanical engineering and metallurgy. The substantial and rapid increase in petroleum production in the Soviet Union was creating a unique opportunity for the GDR’s domestic industry, opening up a vast range of possibilities in the field of petrochemistry. [67]

31 Nevertheless, “energy autarky” based on lignite persisted both in petrochemical and – mainly – in the energy sector. The expansion of raw material transformation directly within the GDR was considered the foundation of the state’s long-term energy security, and the “lignite extraction and transport technologies could be applied for more efficiency [in energy sector development] and for cutting costs”. [68]

32 In 1970 at the 8th Congress of the SED, Willi Stoph, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, emphasized that by 1965, the entire chemical sector was still based on lignite. By 1970, only a quarter of the raw materials came from crude oil. [69] Brown coal remained the first and crucial input for the production of synthetic gasoline through hydrogenation, at least through the first half of the 1960s, even as refineries expanded and oil imports from the USSR increased. [70] At the same time, however, there was a growing desire and hope to cover more than 50% of chemical production with oil by 1975. [71] Indeed, the utilization of crude oil in the chemical sector could save a considerable quantity of coal, which could, in theory, be employed for alternative purposes, especially in the energy sector. Willi Stoph, in the same speech noted that the objectives in the energy sector of the preceding Plan had not been met, and thus, future efforts to develop electricity production were to be based on the expansion of the domestic lignite sector. [72] This policy appeared to yield satisfactory results, so much so that in 1976, at the 9th Congress of the SED, Horst Sindermann, successor to Willi Stoph as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, expressed the intention to continue the policy of using domestically sourced raw materials instead of imported ones for the development of the economic sector. [73] (Graph 3)

Graph 3: Electricity generation by energy source (In million kWh, 1955-1987)

Description

,0
,0
,0
kWh
,0
,0
,0
 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989
Years
Brown coal Hard coal Hydropower Mineral oil Nuclear fuel Others

Graph 3: Electricity generation by energy source (In million kWh, 1955-1987)

Conclusion

33 The post-World War II crisis resulted in the destruction of Germany’s economic and productive structures. The initial measures taken to reactivate the apparatus in the Soviet zone of occupation were focused on the energy and coal-based chemical industry. This is consistent with other cases discussed in this special issue. For example, a similar situation was observed in Greece, which also lacked high-value energy sources, or in Denmark, where coal import shortages, however, soon began to hinder the country’s recovery after WWII [74]. In the case of the GDR, the strategy to rely on domestic energy sources of low calorific value proved surprisingly effective in quickly addressing the supply deficit and reviving the East German economy, particularly in the first years under examination. It could be argued that brown coal was the “East German gold”.

34 The complete reliance on lignite persisted at least a decade longer than the average European Short Coal Age, making the GDR a distinctive case within Europe. Brown coal became the most crucial element in the economic recovery process in spite of the greater difficulty in processing it to obtain the necessary energy and the significantly larger quantity required to achieve the same result, compared to higher-value fuels such as hard coal or petroleum. The political quest for “energy autarky” based on more secure domestic fuels, continued even until the 1980s. It continued when oil imports from the Soviet Union had become relatively cheap and, moreover, when they were not. During oil supply cuts, the GDR relied again on lignite. Until 1990, when East Germany ceased to exist, lignite remained by far the most important energy source in the country.

35  It should be pointed out that the reliance on lignite in lieu of imported fuels was not necessarily the main reason behind the GDR’s failure to catch up with the West in terms of economic development. The reasons for this ineffectiveness are not solely attributable to the challenges associated with transforming the energy system. Technical backwardness, a discrepancy between the perceived capabilities of the system and established goals, and a focus on political objectives over economic necessities contributed to the GDR’s failure to catch up.

36  The technological obsolescence of the production facilities was closely tied to the perceived impossibility of switching to a different supply source. Processing another type of fuel would have required adapting the existing infrastructure. However, the adaptation of infrastructure would have necessitated the implementation of investment policies, which, regrettably, proved to be unsuccessful. Consequently, the production process continued to rely exclusively – or, at the very least, to a significant extent – on lignite.

37  The economic goals set out by the SED, particularly the two Five-Year Plans of the 1950s, included the development of the energy sector and domestic resource production in quantities sufficient to support the development of the new industrial apparatus, especially heavy industry, and subsequently, the needs for cooperation and exchange with other Comecon countries, as well as the expansion of the consumer goods sector. This was particularly evident in the mid-1950s. Following the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in early 1956, and an overall critical examination of the centrally planned economies throughout the Eastern Bloc, each country should have promoted its own national economy based on its own specific characteristics. [75] However, it was also claimed that a division of labour existed within Comecon, and that coordination occurred within the Council regarding different development plans. Consequently, the Eastern countries aligned their economic plans with that of the USSR, thereby facilitating dialogue and coordination between the parties. In this context, the measures had to be taken initially with a view to managing the collaboration and producing the requisite products for trade. Those concerning the energy system were also intended to contribute to this objective, yet they failed to consider the inherent difficulties or address the underlying structural issues. Furthermore, they did not address the discrepancy between supply and demand. The emphasis on these issues, in essence, eclipsed the reality that domestic industry was not sufficiently developed to sustain – technologically or quantitatively – the requisite energy and industrial production.

38 So, the strategies initiated in the latter half of the 1950s, encompassing increased trade with the capitalist West and the substitution of crude oil for coal in industrial sectors, can be regarded as politically and economically reasonable.

39 However, it is also understandable that lignite remained the main solution to rely on in dealing with other energy crises as well, given its importance in the early postwar years for the recovery of the industry. This “safe haven” appeared to have finally been superseded by gas and oil in the 1990s, following unification with West Germany and the adaptation of energy and industrial production and procedures to the Western system, including for environmental reasons. The “safe haven” dynamic re-emerged in the contemporary debate about the energy crisis after 2022. Coal has been positioned again as a partial solution to the crisis, with more than a dozen power plants, utilizing both hard coal and brown coal, either reactivated or not shut down as originally planned. The reintroduction of coal as a means of reducing gas consumption from Russia (or at least the mentioning of coal while dealing with energy issues) was controversial, as evidenced by the remarks of the Minister for Economy Robert Habeck, who referred to this course of action as “bitter, aber notwendig” (bitter but necessary), despite the associated challenges. [76] The continued use of coal as the cheapest and most readily available source of energy in Germany is still a point of contention in discussions about energy strategies. [77] As was the case in the GDR of the 1950s, the necessity to be able to rely on a domestic “safe” source of energy in the context of a shortage of other sources takes precedence over other considerations, including high consumption and environmental impact.