AA: Aluminium Association AAC: Alliance Aluminium Compagnie, also called «Alliance » AE: Archivio Edison, Corsico, Milan AF: Aluminium Français AI: Alluminio Italiano, also called « Borgofranco » AIAG: Aluminium Industrie Aktiengesellschaft Alcoa: Aluminum* Company of America Alted: Aluminium Limited ARAP: Alcan Rio Tinto Archives, Paris ASA: Alluminio Società Anonima ASBI: Archivio Storico Banca d’Italia, Rome ASI: Archivio San Paolo – Intesa, Milano ASIRI: Archivio Storico IRI (Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale), Roma (also online at ww.fondazioneiri.it) ATdR: Archivio Thaon de Revel, Fondazione Luigi Einaudi, Torino Baco: British Aluminium Company BCI: Banca Commerciale Italiana Cons.: Consumption INA: Industria Nazionale Alluminio LLL: Lavorazione Leghe Leggere Naco: Northern Aluminium Company PCN: Prodotti Chimici Nazionali Prod.: Production Sava: Società Alluminio Veneta Anonima, also called « Porto Marghera » SDN: Société des Nations, Geneva SIA: Società Italiana Allumina Sida: Società Italiana dell’Alluminio, also called «Mori » SIE: Società Italiana di Elettrochimica Sifa: Società Italiana per la Fabbricazione dell’Alluminio, also called « Bussi » Snal: Società Nazionale dell’Alluminio VAW: Vereinigte Aluminium Werke

List of Abbreviations (Archives, Companies, Terms...) [*]

1

Quand on étudie une affaire en Norvège, on étudie uniquement une usine dans l’univers soumise aux conditions mondiales. Celui qui veut fonder ou étendre ses affaires en Italie doit tout d’abord se préoccuper d’un marché, connaître ses capacités d’achat, sûr néanmoins le jour où il aura acquis ce marché, d’écouler sa marchandise sans craindre la concurrence mondiale [1].

2This article examines the policy of the international aluminium industry cartel in relation to Italy during the interwar period [2]. The global aluminium industry was at the time largely controlled by an international oligopoly, formed by few companies, which set up cartel agreements with the aim to control international production and markets. This oligopoly was formed by several European companies (Aluminium Français, Aluminium Industrie Aktiengesellschaft, British Aluminium Company and Vereinigte Aluminium Werke) and the American trust (the sole American enterprise was the Aluminium Company of America with its Canadian subsidiary Northern Aluminium Company, which had been transformed into a formally independent company in 1928, the Aluminium Limited). Almost all of these leading international companies (AF, Alcoa, VAW, AIAG) invested in Italy following different strategies of internationalisation, thus attempting to place the Italian aluminium industry under the control of international cartels. Cartel policy, however, was not effective in Italy and the country remained something of an outsider and competitor for the international oligopoly.

3The international strategy for the Italian aluminium industry followed different phases. Aluminium Français invested in Italy during the war to supply the military demand of the government. Other international companies developed a strategy to control Italian bauxite ores in the Istria, a region annexed through the Versailles’s treaty. Then, in 1926-1928, international companies turned to aluminium production, attempting to control the development of Italian plants in order to import growing quantities of aluminium for national demand. During 1928-1931, Italy radically modified its international position, increasing its production beyond its consumption capacities and thus becoming an exporting country through agreements with leading international companies. This transformation was the result of the international cartel’s policy for Italy: European companies, aggregated in a cartel called the « Aluminium Association», initiated a period of competition against Alcoa and Italy was one of the battle-fields of this struggle. Italian companies were considered fruitful partners of the AA, which in turn decided to help them by consenting to export quotas.

4However in 1931, the Italian companies had became an inopportune ally, when AA and Alcoa finally reached an agreement and established a new global cartel, the « Alliance Aluminium Compagnie », in order to recover from the over-production and accumulation of stocks that followed the international crisis. In this new context, previous export agreements between AA and Italian companies had suddenly become undesirable but the new cartel could not renege them. All the companies that invested in Italy exploited these agreements to gain additional production quotas of and the relations with the Italian companies became something of an Achilles’ heel for the stability of the cartel. This situation endured until 1935, when the export agreements came to term and the Italian government developed a policy for helping the aluminium producers, which took the form of the 1937 State economic program for this metal: the « Piano Autarchico per l’Alluminio ».

5The Italian example shows the break away of national producers from the control of an international cartel. Not only was the government strategy crucial in these changes, but the attitude and strategies of international firms concerning Italy also held great importance. Leading international companies invested in Italy in order to strengthen their position before the signature of the cartel. Then, once the cartel was organised in 1926, cartel members used Italy as a tool against American companies. Finally, on reaching an agreement with the Americans in 1931, they tried to modify their policy concerning Italy once again. However, this strategy was complicated by the emergence of Montecatini, an uncomfortable allied for the cartel. Montecatini was one of the largest and most powerful Italian companies, producing electricity, and controlling a wide range of mining activities. Its chairman, Guido Donegani, was a member of the Italian parliament (he became senator in 1943), and a very influent person in politics. Indeed, this company had very close links to political power and the government was well inclined to help and provide support against international competitors.

6The experience of the aluminium industry in Italy demonstrates how and why a powerful international cartel lost control over a national industry. It also brings to light the relationship between an international economic structure, a powerful national company that wanted to grow despite the international cartel and a government that wanted to help a national company. In the case of aluminium, the government also had its own aims in terms of substituting importation for strategic needs. This aspect renders the history of aluminium industry more complicated because it was not simply a question of national interests versus international power, but a game between three actors with different needs and aims. This mélange of different interests reduced the international cartel’s capacity for control to the extent where, despite its presumed power, it was unable to control Italian production.

7This article will present three different phases of the history of the aluminium industry in Italy. The first part will present the first phase (1925-1929) when Italy began as an importing country. Then the second part will describe the transition to exporting nation (1930-1934). During the final phase, (1935-1943), Italy attempted to become self-sufficient and the government developed a policy to increase aluminium consumption and production.

The pre-cartel investments of the mid-twenties: internationalization and diversification

8The first aluminium plant in Italy was the Società Italiana per la Fabbricazione dell’Alluminio, built up in 1905 in Bussi (Abruzzi), when the high prices of the first international aluminium cartel provided an opportunity for diversification for Società Italiana di Elettrochimica, an electrical and chemical producer that wanted to find additional outlets for energy [3]. To ensure good production profitability, SIE also purchased bauxite ore in the Abruzzi region and built an alumina reduction plant [4]. This society was owned by Lorenzo Allievi, the president of SIE, and by a German merchant - metal firm, Sondheimer & Beer [5]. This small firm, with a production capacity of around 600 t/a, later adhered to the international cartel in 1912 and Allievi became the « aluminium-man » of pre-war Italy.

9During the Great War, the German interests in the Italian aluminium firm were confiscated and French companies Aluminium Français and Bouchayer & Viallet [6] took over their shares in Allievi’s enterprise. The Italian government set up a war syndicate for aluminium in which Aluminium Français was made responsible for the construction of an aluminium plant in Nera Montoro alongside Allievi for supplying miltary demand [7]. This collaboration between the Italian government and French companies rendered possible the creation of Alluminio Italiano, which was officially an affiliate of Aluminium Français [8]. Thus, after the war, Aluminium Français held a good position in Italy and was expected to develop Italian aluminium production through the construction of a new plant in Borgofranco, near Aoste. However, the years between 1919 and 1922 proved very difficult for the Italian economy, heavily affecting aluminium production. The presence of war-stocks and the general crisis of demand lead Aluminium Français to cease production at the Italian plant and to postpone new investments [9]. After the 1921-1922 crisis, the Italian market experienced strong development which in turn, fuelled imports. See Table.1.1:

Table.1.1

Aluminium Production, Consumption and Imports in Italy, 1920-1929, in metric tons

Year Production Consumption Imports Production as % of Consumption Imports as % of Consumption 1920 1,200 2,000 - 85.00 - 1921 700 1,000 - 70.00 - 1922 800 1,000 200 80.00 20.00 1923 1,473 3,323 1,977 44.32 55.68 1924 2,058 4,961 2,947 41.48 58.52 1925 1,880 8,506 6,693 22.10 77.90 1926 1,929 5,445 3,566 35.42 64.58 1927 2,544 5,846 3,617 43.51 56.49 1928 3,618 5,141 1,760 70.37 29.63 1929 7,036 10,113 3,284 69.57 30.49

Aluminium Production, Consumption and Imports in Italy, 1920-1929, in metric tons

10Import levels varied during 1923-1928 but averaged about 4,000 t/a and over half of national demand was satisfied by imports. In 1925 the Lira had a very low value, causing an increase of internal prices that drove a general rise of aluminium imports which reached almost 78% of demand [10]. Imports were driven by the lack of production to satisfy the growing demand for aluminium. Uses for aluminium grew during the First World War and continued to do so in the post-war period, except during the crisis of 1921-1922. These applications were progressively transferred to civilian industries. The needs of Fiat and the automotive industry, of railroads and the electrical industry, pushed the big Italian companies to increasingly import more aluminium [11]. Fiat, in particular, grew at an impressive speed, reaching growing export markets. By 1925, it had become the largest Italian buyer of aluminium [12].

11Aluminium imports caused three major reactions: 1) the Italian government, in an attempt to reduce or avoid these imports, started to interact with AF and to raise the customs duties for aluminium; 2) AF, the only big producer in the country, tried to develop the plant in Borgofranco, and to re-organize the investments as a whole in collaboration with Allievi, but did not achieve this goal; 3) aluminium, with its great demand, became a good opportunity for diversification for some hydro-electrical and chemical companies that had excess electricity production. Montecatini was one of those companies.

12In spite of the pressure of Italian political power to expand production and the increase of duty on alumina and aluminium in 1921, AF stalled from 1922 to 1924. During this period, the French investors tried to assess how durable the increased Italian demand would be before strengthening their position there but the ‘war-profit taxation’ by Italian authorities and the control of capital export by French authorities created an environment of uncertainty concerning the possibility of investments [13]. Therefore, from 1921 to 1924, AF would not commit to investments and only in 1924 did it begin the studies for the enlargement of Borgofranco with the financial help of Alcoa, who was investing in Europe during this period [14].

13In 1921 Alcoa initiated a strategy to buy and control a large amount of bauxite ores in Istria [15]. Thus, Alcoa bought 50% of shares of Alluminio Italiano and backed the investment of 30 million Lire to increase the capacity of production of Borgofranco (from 1,500 t/a to 2,200) [16]. After the First World War, AF and Alcoa also collaborated in other projects, besides AI, in Norway and Spain. These new operations were also conceived by the French company in order to reach a new cartel agreement [17]. Furthermore, the company Alais, Froges et Camargue, who controlled AF, asked for American help in order to find capital to lighten its own cash output after having heavily invested in electricity plants in France [18]. However, this investment was not enough to cover total Italian demand and it was very incomplete: there was nor a medium-term plan to increase electrical power and neither any plan to produce alumina. Furthermore, the plant in Borgofranco was difficult to enlarge because of its geographical location thus the only solution to increase aluminium production was to build another factory elsewhere [19].

14Exploiting the uncertainty of AF and Alcoa, in 1925 Montecatini announced its intentions to invest in aluminium production [20]. After the Great War, Montecatini started a phase of expansion and invested in electrochemical and in hydro-electrical energy to produce nitrogen and synthetic ammonia. The chemical company would exploit the growing Italian demand and provide a substitute to imports, helped in by the augmentation in custom rights [21]. This worried the American-French investors because they knew the financial power of Montecatini, its political influence and its proximity to the big Italian banking interests [22]. The situation of AI was aggravated in the short term by the Italian economic policy called ‘quota 90’ [23]. This policy of revaluation of the Lira caused a lot of problems for the Italian aluminium market because ‘quota 90’ slowed the consumption of Italian consumers, which were accumulating stocks, and placed Borgofranco in a negative position in terms of imports, especially from Switzerland [24].

Italian aluminium industry, before 1940, in Panseri, Carlo, L’alluminio e le sue leghe, Vol. 1, Milano, Ulrico Hoepli, 1940, p. 51.

15In the period from 1926 to 1928, the situation of the Italian aluminium industry changed radically and some new companies became the most important producers in Italy, surpassing Alcoa-AF. While AF and Alcoa continued to study the enlargement of capacity of Borgofranco and understood the importance of having an alumina factory, Montecatini continued its plans in aluminium production and acquired the patent for alumina production from VAW (the « Haglund » patent). AIAG also entered the Italian market at this time [25].

16In December 1926 AIAG and an Italian group of producers of electricity, represented by Marco Barnabò, set up the Società Alluminio Veneta Anonima in Venice to produce alumina and aluminium. Sava gained a large share of the alumina production from the Bussi factory and took control over it with the co-operation of Allievi: Bussi was an alumina plant that was not very profitable but delivered the alumina for AI and produced a small quantity of aluminium (see Table 1.2). An agreement between Sava-AIAG and Bussi provided that Bussi shipped all its alumina produced to Sava and ceased its production of aluminium when Sava commenced operations in 1929. Both Montecatini and Sava, in fact, planned to be able to commence aluminium production in 1929 when the factories would be completed [26].

17Louis Marlio, AF chairman and president of the international cartel since 1926, understood the problems of the Italian market. In 1929-1930 its total production capacity was estimated at 10,000 tons or more while consumption was only 6,500 [27]. The major problem for AF was the impossibility to develop Borgofranco and the absence of a good alumina plant under its control. Although it launched some studies about an alumina plant to be built in Genoa or in Savona, by 1928 it was too late to build a new alumina plant when two other companies had just taken control over the major share of production [28].

18At the end of 1928 AF took the decision to divest in order to concentrate its international investments in other countries such as Spain, Norway and Eastern-Europe [29]. The AI Borgofranco factory was taken over by Alted, a Canadian company formed by Alcoa in 1928 to manage its international interests, and which has started to develop an alternative patent for alumina using leucite instead of bauxite. The ‘Blanc’ patent was lodged in 1922 in Italy by an Italian chemist, Baron Luigi Blanc, and its aims were to produce potassium salts and alumina from leucite, a mineral abundant in the centre of Italy and cheaper than bauxite [30]. The ‘leucite affair’, like Duncan Campbell called it, was seen as a great opportunity by Alcoa and by the Italian government because this patent would produce fertilizers for agriculture (for which there was a great demand in Italy) and alumina, and both cheaply.

19Alcoa made contact with Blanc in April 1928 and decided to buy the patent and his small pilot plant, before Montecatini or other European companies could [31]. In reality, Montecatini and AF did not want to buy the patent because, after having tested it, they judged it not competitive [32]. In spite of the little consideration the Blanc process had in Italian economic milieux, the Italian government and Alcoa trusted the patent promise to produce alumina from leucite in a competitive way. Alted set up a large experimental plant in Aurelia (near Rome) called Prodotti Chimici Nazionali in 1931 with the help of the government and endeavoured to produce alumina and potash economically, but in 1938, after successive failures, the decision was finally taken to convert the plant to use the Bayer patent [33]. This plant did not produce any aluminium, was closed down, and Alted pulled out, leaving the company to the Italian government which settled the Società Italiana Potassa without achieving production [34]. The bad choice of patent had frustrated the Alcoa’s Italian policy which, while waiting to have an alumina plant in Italy, had done nothing to develop the smelter at Borgofranco which remained very small [35].

20The two largest aluminium factories were Sida and Sava, respectively owned by Montecatini-VAW and AIAG. The exact nature of the collaboration between Montecatini and VAW is unclear, but it appears that the two companies found some common interests to develop a relationship in the Venice area. Montecatini was looking for an outlet for its electricity production because it wanted to convert synthetic ammonia plant, the Sila, which it could not exploit [36]. Donegani established the collaboration with VAW that would develop a new patent for alumina, called Haglund [37]. At the same time, VAW controlled some bauxite deposits in Istria and considered it profitable to build an alumina plant near the deposits to export part of the production to Germany [38]. Thus, VAW provided its technical help to Donegani for producing aluminium and alumina and the German enterprise took 50% of shares in the aluminium company, the Sida of Mori, and in a new and alumina company, called SIA (Società Italiana Allumina). The capacity envisaged for Sida was 6,000 tons of aluminium per year, and 15,000 of alumina [39].

Direct-current generator of the Mori power plant, 1929. ARAP, 056-00-12347, Società italiana dell’alluminio, Lo stabilimento di Mori, Milano, 1929.

21Sava had a similar history, but the Italian share of ownership was less than in Sida because Sava was an AIAG subsidiary. Before 1926, AIAG was also a large importer in Italy, and its products were well placed in the Italian market [40]. The growing Italian demand of 1925 pushed the Swiss company to invest in Italy. AIAG received help from Marco Barnabò, the chairman of several hydroelectricity plants [41]. In 1925, Bernabò took the decision to search for a new outlet for his electricity by constructing an aluminium plant in Porto Marghera, near Venice, profiting from the state’s subsidies for the development of so-called ‘industrial zones’ [42]. In 1926 with the help of AIAG that underwrote 70% of Sava’s shares, Barnabò received the technical assistance to build his aluminium plant [43].

22By investing in Italy, AIAG also aimed to redevelop business after the loss of its prominent position in world trade before World War I. AIAG had been the leader of the international cartel before World War I and its production was exported to Germany because the Swiss market was too small to absorb its production. The war transformed this situation because the creation of VAW substantially reduced the possibility for export to Germany, thus depriving AIAG of its main outlet. Furthermore, the instability of the international market and the rise of custom barriers made it impossible for an export-oriented company like AIAG to continue its pre-war strategy.

23So AIAG began to expand into Germany, Spain, and finally, Italy [44]. As in the case of VAW, two organizations (one Italian and one international) had conceived a common strategy with mutual benefits.

24This new situation in the Italian aluminium industry greatly modified the balance between production and exports. The situation endured until 1934, when another major transformation modified the structure of Italian ownership and production. See Table.1.2:

Table.1.2

Aluminium production, consumption, imports and exports in Italy and production by company, 1926-1934, in metric tons

Year Sifa AI Sida Sava Tot. Prod. Tot. Cons. Imports Exports 1926 817 1,112 - - 1,929 5,000 3,780 137 1927 956 1,588 - - 2,544 5,200 4,226 252 1928 993 1,355 70 1,200 3,618 4,000 2,166 311 1929 815 1,168 4,000 1,390 7,373 9,300 3,520 270 1930 - 1,309 4,870 1,789 7,968 8,200 1,543 710 1931 - 1,060 5,900 4,146 11,106 7,000 1,698 3,018 1932 - 1,288 6,062 6,063 13,413 5,500 410 2,485 1933 - 1,521 4,444 6,106 12,071 7,000 274 3,947 1934 - 1,647 4,899 6,310 12,856 9,400 225 5,933

Aluminium production, consumption, imports and exports in Italy and production by company, 1926-1934, in metric tons

25Italian production was higher than national demand, and an overproduction crisis, as anticipated by Louis Marlio in 1927, occurred in 1931 and worsened in 1932. In reaction, the Italian aluminium industry organised itself into a national cartel, called ASA (Alluminio Società Anomina) where Sida and Sava (without AI-Alted) fixed production quotas and prices [46]. However, the national cartel did not redress Italian industry from overproduction: it was the international cartel and two member companies (AIAG and VAW) who ‘rescued’ the Italian market by according increased export quotas. This measure was contrary to cartel policy in this period of crisis, because it allowed Italian companies to continue production at optimal levels while all the other countries drastically reduced their own production, as we can see in Table.1.3.

Table.1.3

Aluminium production and consumption in main European countries, 1929-1933, in metric tons x 1,000

Year France Switzerland Germany Great-Britain Norway Italy Prod. Cons. Prod. Cons. Prod. Cons. Prod. Cons. Prod. Cons. Prod. Cons. 1929 29,0 25,0 20,7 8,0 32,7 39,0 14,0 30,0 24,4 - 7,0 9,3 1930 26,0 20,0 20,5 7,0 30,2 28,0 14,0 24,0 24,7 - 8,0 8,2 1931 18,0 18,0 12,5 5,0 26,9 24,0 12,5 20,0 22,0 - 11,2 7,0 1932 15,0 15,0 8,5 4,5 19,0 18,5 10,2 20,0 17,8 - 13,4 5,5 1933 14,5 16,0 7,5 5,5 18,9 27,5 11,0 21,0 15,5 - 12,1 7,0

Aluminium production and consumption in main European countries, 1929-1933, in metric tons x 1,000

26Italy was authorized to produce above the capacity of absorption of its national market and sold the surplus to the cartel for stockpiling while other countries reduced their production by up to 50% compared with 1929 levels. This situation gave some advantages to AIAG, which found a method to increase its production during the crisis period, and to a lesser extent, to VAW, which had not achieved satisfactory production levels at Haglund. On the other hand, this situation was greatly exploited by Donegani, who increased his interest in aluminium. The Italian companies did not have a clear position in the international cartel, playing the role of ‘semi-outsiders’ but with great advantages. This article will now move on to explore the international cartel relations that produced these advantages.

Italian production and international cartels. From take-over to « isolation », 1928-1934

27In 1925-1926 when the Italian companies were just being established, AIAG, VAW and AF were negotiating the setting up a European cartel and Alcoa was their competitor. For this reason, Italy was something of a ‘battlefield’ for international companies that wanted to gain a good position during the negotiations for the cartel agreement. In fact, the 11^th September 1926 AF, Baco, AIAG and VAW signed the contract for the Aluminium Association in Paris while Alcoa stayed out of this cartel [47]. After some agreements over price and particularly concerning the export market since 1922, the stabilisation of the economic and political situation in 1926 encouraged the emergence of international cartels, such as the aluminium one [48].

28The Aluminium Association was created to avoid over-production and regulate the international markets after a period of investments, expansions and inflation in the first half of the Twenties that had caused some overproduction problems [49]. Italian plants were part of this general trend of expansions and investments. Since 1923, AI was represented at the meetings of the European producers and it had two delegates on the cartel board [50]. Thus, this company followed resolutions and other agreements taken in the « pre-cartel » meetings, and the presence of these companies in Italy made possible the imports of 1922-1926 [51]. Furthermore, AF assigned AI and Sifa a quota of 1,800 t/a, taken from the French quota in the Aluminium Association, and AF preferred to import into Italy instead of producing there [52].

29In spite of the membership of international owners of Italian factories in the Aluminium Cartel and the presence of AI in the meetings before 1926, Italian production did not have a clear position in regards to membership of the cartel settled in 1926. Sava was under the control of AIAG, VAW had 50% ownership of Sida and AI was in the hands of Alted and, before 1928, was 50% controlled by Aluminium Français. The cartel contract did not provide for anything concerning the participation and role of foreign subsidiaries for cartel members. The cartel members could take a participation in some outside companies, but they had to ensure the control of those companies (over 50% of shares) [53]. To avoid the emergence of powerful outsiders in those countries where demand was starting but there was no national producer, the Aluminium Association wanted to control the new companies through its members’ investments. The cartel’s aims were to avoid outsiders controlling new productions.

Alumina plant, Bayer’s process, certainly in Porto Marghera, before 1940, in Panseri, Carlo, op.cit., p. 74.

30However, decisions taken during this period (1928-1929) had a number of consequences that affected the history of the Italian aluminium industry. In 1926 the cartel and the Italian producers came to an agreement by which international cartel prices would be respected in Italy. This conclusion was reached to avoid the large price reductions continually demanded by Fiat, which was the biggest consumer of aluminium in Italy and was for ever trying to lower aluminium prices. At this time AI was the only producer and Alcoa, which owned a half of it, assured the cartel that the price would be maintained [54].

31When the two new plants commenced operation in 1929, the cartel members started negotiations to regulate the relations between those companies and the cartel, through the fixing of production quotas. The members made the decision to take the quotas from their market contingents fixed by the cartel board and to import into Italy until Sava and Sida had started to produce [55]. In spite of the attempt to control Italian production and to avoid exports, Sava and Sida production capacity was too great for national demand and the presence of Montecatini reduced the possibility of lowering production and import in Italy [56]. Donegani was considered very dangerous by the international cartel, and some of the members believed it would be preferable to exclude him from aluminium industry by buying his shares in Sida. However, this solution was impossible to achieve as Donegani had arrangements with the Italian government for the production of aluminium for electrical cables. The cartel had to find a modus vivendi with the Italian chemical trust and started negotiations through AIAG and VAW [57].

32Donegani was opposed to reducing his production for three main reasons. First, he had built an aluminium plant for the use of excess electricity and a long period of inactivity would make it difficult to amortize the investments for the construction of Mori. Unlike old companies, Sida had to amortize its plants in the short run. Secondly, he had several sales contracts with the government for which he could not stop production and imports. He foresaw a market for 9,000 tons in 1930, partially required by cables for energy transport and the government asked Italian companies to cover the national demand and to overpass it in order to substitute copper in many other applications. Third, AI, now an Alted affiliate, did not participate in the national cartel and was a powerful competitor for ASA, importing at a very low price. If Montecatini and Sava had reduced their production, their production costs would have increased and their capacity to resist to the American offensive would have been greatly reduced [58]. So, the production in Italy couldn’t be reduced by the international agreement because some aspects of the Italian market and international competition ran counter to it. However the cartel did try to sign a contract with Donegani in order to avoid uncontrolled exports from Italy.

Potroom, Bolzano smelter, INA, before 1940, in Panseri, Carlo, op.cit., p. 95.

33Toward the end of 1929, at time when Sava and Sida established the national cartel without the participation of AI, AA signed an agreement with ASA. Aluminium Association took responsibility to buy and export the production surplus of up to 2,000 tons for 1930 and 1931 and guaranteed that it would avoid any sales contracts that were for importation into Italy. The purchase price of Italian aluminium was fixed at the Association’s price less 5 gold £, that being 75£. This price was still profitable for Italian producers but was lower than the price that they could obtain on the national market. Through another agreement with ASA, AIAG and VAW also agreed to export the fixed surplus of 2,000 tons until the end of 1934. Furthermore, the two Italian companies each had a right of production of 6,000 tons since 1930, and this tonnage corresponded approximately to the foreseen Italian consumption [59].

34These agreements, highly profitable for Italian companies, were influenced not only by their relations with Donegani but also by their relations with the Americans. Cartel members were at the peak of their competition against Alcoa, and they wanted to keep the pressure up in all European markets. In Italy, where Alcoa had many interests in research patents, bauxite deposits and in aluminium production, the cartel tried to use Italian production as restraint against Alcoa. AI, in fact, did not take part in the Italian cartel (ASA) and this cartel, signed between Bloch (chairman of AIAG and of Sava), Von der Porten (chairman of VAW) and Guido Donegani, was done so with anti-American aims. For this reason, the agreement between AA and ASA fixed Sava and Sida’s production quota at the level of national demand in order to keep out AI, and cartel thus assumed the risk of over-production excess [60].

35However, this agreement between AA and the Italian producers did not resolve the Italian situation and was to cause an important problem for the cartel. This is because in 1930 and 1931, Italian demand failed to reach 12,000 tons and the economic crisis had heavy consequences on sales in Italy. The AA asked Bloch to start new negotiations with Italian producers in order to halt their production capacity and let Donegani know that the cartel could not buy any more aluminium for 1932 [61]. So, while AA agreed to an exportation quota for production surplus, Bloch and Von der Porten were asked to ensure that Montecatini did not enlarge its capacity over 6,000 t/a and tried to sell all Italian production on the national market. Sava was treated in the same manner: it was requested to not exceed a capacity of 6,000 and to try to place its production on the national market. The cartel’s companies had quite overestimated Italy’s consumption capacity and given too much importance to the anti-American aims of agreement, leaving an excess of freedom to Donegani. AA also underestimated the danger of Italian companies because it did not believe that Sida and Sava would be able to produce 12,000 tons in 1930. On the other hand, the contract was considered effective to discourage overproduction, by fixing a price lower than the international price of 1929 [62].

Hydroelectric facilities of Mori, 1929. ARAP, 056-00-12347, Società italiana dell’alluminio, Lo stabilimento di Mori, Milano, 1929.

36From 1929 to 1931 the international aluminium industry accumulated over 100,000 tons of unsold stock while total global demand was only 135,000 tons in 1932 [63]. This over-production was not only due to the effects of the crisis, but also the result of the strong competition between the European cartel and the American concern at the end of Twenties. This conflict became increasingly harsh and it drove the two parties maintain their production levels in most of their markets in order to conserve their market position. The crisis pushed Alted to search to find a way to reach an agreement with the European cartel, because its accumulation of unsold stocks was becoming a real concern [64]. Thus, in 1931 the European cartel was reorganized and this time Alted was also included in the new association, called Alliance Aluminium Compagnie [65]. With the inclusion of Alted into the international cartel, one of main reasons behind the agreement with Donegani disappeared, and in the new context the agreement of 1929 had lost its reason to be.

37Alliance Aluminium Compagnie was set up in Basel in October 1931 and its main aims were to sell the stocks and redress the international market from over-production. This time also Alted was a member of the cartel that can be considered a « global » cartel because all foreign interests of Alcoa were owned by Alted and the American market was cut off to rest of the world. To achieve its aims, the Alliance started to work like an international ‘clearing house’ that managed stocks, found markets and fixed prices. Alliance started to buy the entire surplus at a fixed price to lighten the pressure of overproduction on the international market and to discourage cartel members from superseding their quotas. At the same time, Alliance restricted production of all members, and for some periods the plants of cartel members functioned at only 50% or 30% of capacity [66]. That was the result of a strategy envisaged by Alliance: the right of production of each member was periodically fixed in response to the capacity of global demand. The major aim of Alliance was to adapt production to consumption while trying to sell off the accumulated stockpiles at the same time [67].

38Those aims were not achieved for the Italian market because Italy did not restrict production while the Italian demand plunged. The agreement of 1929, guaranteeing a price for exportation of 75£ gold, was more profitable than the internal price and more profitable than the price other cartel members could obtain. Thus, the agreement, signed for 5 years caused liquidity problems for Alliance, who was obliged to buy the Italian aluminium for a profitable price. In fact, AIAG and VAW bought metal from Sida and Sava for 75£, then stock-piled it and, as the provided by the cartel contract, sold it to Alliance for a lower price [68]. At some times, AIAG and VAW re-exported the Italian production to other countries such as Japan, China or Russia, fixing the respective quotas in the national Italian cartel, the ASA [69].

39The crisis was really detrimental to the terms of the contract because when Italian production managed to cover the calculated demand of 1930 12,000 tons), demand then fell to 7,000 tons in 1931 and to 5,500 tons in 1932 (see the Table.1.2) and the surplus rose quickly. This growing surplus was bought by Alliance collectively and by AIAG and VAW up to an average of almost 6,000 tons in 1934. Demand returned to 1929 levels only in 1935. Sida and Sava, through the 1929 contract, had the permission to produce 6,000 tons each, with AIAG and VAW guaranteeing that the difference between this production and demand would be exported. So, with the fall in demand in 1930-1934, the general balance of import-export for Italian aluminium had changed radically since 1931 and Italy became an exporting country instead of an importing one. Exports from Italy were only made possible by the international agreements, because their cost price wasn’t as low as other countries and it did not permit to export in a competitive market [70].

40In 1928-1929, when the production of Sida and Sava started up, Italy slowed the massive imports of previous years, and in 1931 imports stopped completely because these two plants had completed their investment. See at Table.2.1:

Table.2.1

Production and production capacity of Italian companies, 1929-1933, in metric tons

Production Production 1929 1930 1931 1932 capacity 1.1.1933 Sava 2,000 2,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 Sida 4,000 4,877 5,900 6,232 6,500 AI 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 2,000 Total (P) 7,000 7,877 10,900 12,232 14,500 Italian demand (D) 9,300 8,200 7,000 5,500 Difference P-D -2,300 -323 3,900 6,732

Production and production capacity of Italian companies, 1929-1933, in metric tons

41The production of Sida and Sava, as noted in this table, was not restricted during the crisis and they reached almost maximum production capacity according to the clauses of the 1929 contract [71]. The existence of this contract avoided any regulation of Italian production in Alliance’s foundation agreement, further disturbing the functioning of the cartel and maintaining Italy in a better position than other countries [72]. Italian companies did not take part in Alliance, which was formed by the companies of Aluminium Association and Alted, and they were always considered as a ‘semi-outsiders’ without a precise status. During the negotiations of Alliance, the inclusion and participation of ‘semi-outsiders’ like Sida, Sava and AI was envisaged for 1934 when the former contract would come to term [73].

42The period 1931-1934 coincided with the core of the crisis: the Alliance perfectly understand that even a small amount of aluminium escaping their control could cause great damage to world market and prices. Italy for this reason, with her 6,000 tons of surplus, risked becoming the Achilles’ heel of the cartel. Thus, cartel members started to debate the possibility of changing Donegani’s attitude to encourage him to enter into the Alliance before 1934, but the good terms of the 1929 agreement precluded any success in the negotiations. Furthermore, Sava was also exploiting this contract and AIAG had no interest in changing the agreement. This melange of different interests made it impossible to change the situation without destroying the cohesion of AAC.

43The Italian situation was too complicated to find an easy solution, and the Alliance played for time until the end of 1934, when the Italian agreement came to an end. In the meanwhile it tried to place the excess on the international market. In 1932 Alliance asked E.K. Davis, chairman of Alted, to reach a compromise with Sida and Sava, but he could not arrive at a solution. There were three major reasons that blocked any solution: 1) the propriety assets of Italian companies; 2) the influence of Montecatini in Italian politics and finance; 3) the existence of a written contract that could be rejected.

44With regard to the first point we can consider that the three cartel members who invested in Italy developed an attitude of anti-restriction for Italy. AIAG wished to exploit the occasion to have some guaranteed sales and to develop production inside a growing protected market. VAW had a lot of problems with German demand and production and started to consider Montecatini as a very uncomfortable friend. With the crisis, Germany had great troubles in her balance of payment and lacked the means to pay and invest. VAW was obliged to stop the flux of money to Montecatini and considered the possibility of exiting from Sida and concentrating only on the German market, thus loosing any capacity to control Donegani [74]. Alted was in trouble: it did not have an alumina plant and therefore depended on imports. All its efforts were concentrated on the leucite fiasco that tied up a lot of resources, but it exploited the possibility to produce, albeit at small scale, in the Borgofranco factory.

Guido Donegani (1877-1947)

45Secondly, Montecatini was a strong destabilizing factor in this context but cartel members understood that they could not exclude Donegani from the aluminium business by buying his shares in Sida. Donegani was ‘protected’ by political power and his company was one of the major symbols of the fascist economy. Donegani could also muster great support from the banks in such an operation: he never had the need to sell his share and for Alliance there never was the possibility to envisage buying Donegani’s company [75]. His influence and his power made it impossible to have positive arbitrage for the cartel in an Italian lawsuit after the rupture of the 1929 contract. For these reasons, Alliance did not believe it could escape its commitment [76].

46The absence of any control over production by Italian plants was considered, with hindsight, a great mistake of the cartel. This weakness blunted its capacity of control over global overproduction. In a document about Alliance Aluminium of July 1935, Louis Marlio wrote a note about the failures and achievements of Alliance [77]. Among the mistakes, he pointed out the incapacity to slow down production since 1931, the incapacity to slow German increases in production from 1933 and the Alliance’s attitude in regard of the « question italienne » [78]. In the period 1931-1934 Italian plants took profit of the cartel’s weaknesses, which had no power to control the Italian production and found itself with its hands tied by the agreement of 1929. However, in 1934 this situation ended, and Italian production was isolated from the cartel that lost all reason to reach another agreement with Italy or to bring Italian companies into the cartel.

The end of cartel exports and capacity production expansion. The Autarkic period and the war demand

47In 1934, when the international cartel wished to avoid the expansion of Italian production and hoped to include the three companies in Alliance’s shares, Sida was obliged to halt production by government decree. This fact astonished the Alliance council: the cause of decree was the pollution created by the Mori plant, judged very dangerous for the health of people and animals [79]. The impurity of Haglund’s alumina produced in Porto Marghera by SIA-VAW was the cause of this pollution damage [80]. That induced three main reactions: VAW left Italy, Montecatini set up an autonomous company and the government launched a policy for aluminium.

48VAW and Montecatini started litigation that ended with the dissolution of Sida in 1935 and the liquidation of German interests in Italian production. After the liquidation, Montecatini set up a new company to manage Mori and a new alumina plant and called Società Nazionale Alluminio. The alumina plant in Porto Marghera was converted into a pig iron plant [81]. At the same time, the government forbode the exportation of aluminium and took control of accumulate stockpiles and expanded the uses of aluminium though massive employment of the metal in cables for energy transportation [82].

49The end of the contract between the cartel and the Italian producers as well as the rupture between Sida and VAW meant the definitive exit of Italian production from international control. The cartel had obtained that Italian capacity remain stable, and up to 1934-1935, production capacity remained at the fixed level: 13,000 tons. After its exit from the cartel, Italy launched an autonomous strategy for investments, pricing and marketing. The centre of development became the ASA, the national cartel set up in 1930, and which, in 1937, passed into the hands of the Corporazione della Chimica, a kind of state agency which represented the interests of aluminium producers. Investment decision making passed from the hands of international companies to the Italian companies, reorganized in a cartel, and to the Italian government who, from 1932 onwards, had the right of decision over investments in industrial plants [83].

50After a period of settling down between 1934 and 1936, Italy’s production started to grow at a substantial with the consent of the government. Government policy was directed at encouraging aluminium consumption in order to improve its commercial balance that was troubled after 1935 and for the use of this metal for war-needs [84]. Indeed, the Ethiopian war of 1936 was a good opportunity to increase consumption in the field of aircraft production and thus provided a quick and easy alternative to the cartel exports. The Society of Nations’ sanctions resulting from the war against Ethiopia made this policy all the more effective, by avoiding aluminium exports and imports to and from Italy. Government policies and war demand provided the best replacements for the international cartel agreement in the 1934-1937 phase, and would later fuel an enormous increase in production.

51In this new context, Sava and Montecatini united their interests and planned to enlarge their production following a common national strategy. The two companies also started to increase their production capacity after 1935. In February 1935, (two months after the end of 1929 agreement) AIAG approached the government to build an alumina plant in Porto Marghera for a production capacity of 30,000 t/a with the option to rise to 60,000 tons in a second stage. AIAG’s strategy was to stop alumina production in Switzerland and use Porto Marghera for exporting to its Swiss or German plants [85]. At the same time Bloch and Donegani consolidated their collaboration. In 1935, when Sida was liquidated and reorganized, AIAG gave Montecatini the Bayer patent and started co-operation for the supply of Snal alumina [86]. From 1935 onwards, Montecatini greatly increased its production levels. In addition to its alumina plant at Porto Marghera, Donegani started to build a second aluminium plant in Bolzano, the Industria Nazionale Alluminio, with an initial production capacity of 8,000 t/a [87]. The market in electrical materials and cables provided a good outlet for this expansion, alongside the aviation demand stimulated by the Ethiopian war of 1935-1936.

52In 1937, the Italian government increased its support to the aluminium industry by making this industry a central axis of its so-called policy for self sufficiency, known as Autarky. The country’s balance of payments problem, monetary difficulties and international commerce pushed Italy to embark on a policy of import substitution. Autarky was a phase of general reduction of imports and of development of substitutions. In some industries (chemical, steel, food, mining, glass), the policy was achieved more favourable results. The elaboration of certain plans for substitution was entrusted to the Corporazioni, set up in 1934. Concerning aluminium, the government elaborated a « Piano autarchico per l’alluminio » through the Corporazione della Chimica. Aluminium producers predicted a great increase in national consumption because aluminium could become one of most important materials concerned by the substitution of imports [88].

53Italian companies, such as Montecatini and Sava, used this policy as an opportunity to invest and to diversify with the economic help of the state and with the protection of higher custom duties [89]. This « Piano » pushed the development of aluminium toward greater production capacity in order to substitute other imported metals with aluminium and to improve Italy’s balance of payments. This plan produced a great expansion as showed in Table.3.1:

Table.3.1

Production capacity, production, exports, imports and national consumption of Italian aluminium plants (Sava, Montecatini and AI), 1934-1943, in metric tons

Year Prod. Capacity Total Prod. Total Cons. Exports Imports Prod. Montecatini Prod. Sava Prod. AI 1934 15,000 12,856 9,400 5,932 3 4,899 6,310 1,647 1935 - 13,776 15,000 6,087 203 5,089 7,002 1,685 1936 20,000 15,874 17,000 210 313 7,098 7,094 1,682 1937 28,500 22,947 26,000 - 3,366 13,220 7,984 1,743 1938 36,000 25,677 25,400 446 337 13,828 10,363 1,576 1939 39,000 33,963 32,900 1,166 169 16,744 15,047 2,172 1940 40,000 38,789 42,800 - - 20,395 15,932 2,463 1941 50,000 48,195 59,100 - - 26,722 18,537 2,936 1942 - 43,541 56,100 - - 24,894 16,224 2,423 1943 - 46,192 52,600 - - 28,163 15,889 2,140

Production capacity, production, exports, imports and national consumption of Italian aluminium plants (Sava, Montecatini and AI), 1934-1943, in metric tons

54The « Piano » aimed to substitute other importations of strategic materials, such as fertilizers. The focal point for aluminium in the Italian political milieux, was the ‘Fantasy’ of the Blanc patent which promised to produce both fertilizers and alumina side by side. The Italian government decided to develop aluminium demand and aluminium production that would be partly supplied by « leucitic-alumina ». For this, the government wanted to build, alongside three old plants, three new ones (A, B and C in the Table.3.2) using alumina taken from leucite. The government also wanted to reopen the old Allievi plant at Bussi. The Autarkic committee stressed a schema of increasing production capacity at each plant as noted in Table.3.2:

Table.3.2

1937 Production capacity and projections of the Autarkic Plan, 1938-1942, in metric tons^(a)

Plant Prod. 1937 Projected (a) 1938 Projected (a) 1939 Projected (a) 1940 Projected (a) 1940 Projected (a) 1940 Sava Porto Marghera 8,150 17,350 17,500 17,500 20,000 20,000 Snal, Mori 7,800 8,400 8,500 10,000 10,000 10,000 INA Bolzano 4,700 7,300 9,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 AI Borgofranco 1,600 2,950 3,000 3,000 5,000 5,000 Tot. Old plants 22,250 36,000 38,000 40,500 45,000 45,000 A. Leucite - - 10,000 10,000 10,000 20,000 Bussi (ex Allievi) - - - 5,000 5,000 10,000 B. Leucite - - - - 10,000 20,000 C. Leucite - - - - - 5,000 Total 22,250 36,000 48,000 55,500 70,000 100,000

1937 Production capacity and projections of the Autarkic Plan, 1938-1942, in metric tons^(a)

(a) : Projected Max. Prod. Capacity

55The autarkic plan intended to progressively reach greater production capacity and its ideal was a growth similar to that of the German model, where production and consumption had grown nine-fold since 1932 [90]. Included in the plan was a detailed increase of alumina plants in order to have two tons of alumina for each ton of aluminium. Control of the A, B and C plants would be in the hands of Montecatini and Sava through a ‘Corporazione dell’Alluminio’ [91].

56However, the leucite project did not provide satisfactory results and the 1937 Autarkic plan for aluminium would eventually only concentrate on the production and supplies of Sava and, even more so, of Montecatini. In this plan, the government also planned the supply of electrical energy and the financial aspects. The electrical investments were the heaviest expenses for companies to bear and government help in this area was one of the most important aspects of the policy. The government did not discriminate against the Swiss company in its policy: as result of international problems in currencies, the government made some loans also to Sava when the ‘Piano’ was launched because AIAG could not import capital into Italy [92].

57Production of the four plants evolved up until 1943, when the Armistice interrupted the investments. See Table.3.3:

Table.3.3

Production, national demand and projected production capacity of the “Piano”, 1938-1943, in metric tons

Year Alluminio Italiano (Alcoa) Snal Montecatini Mori INA Montecatini Bolzano Sava Bernabò AIAG Tot. Production National Demand Prod. Capacity in the “Piano” 1938 1,576 7,385 6,443 10,363 25,767 26,000 36,000 1939 2,172 8,603 8,141 15,047 33,963 32,900 38,000 1940 2,463 8,569 11,826 15,932 38,790 42,800 40,500 1941 2,936 7,488 19,234 18,537 48,195 59,100 45,000 1942 2,423 7,143 17,751 16,224 43,541 52,600 50,000 1943 2,140 7,788 20,375 15,889 46,192 56,000 60,000

Production, national demand and projected production capacity of the “Piano”, 1938-1943, in metric tons

58Government intervention in aluminium production was very far from what the ‘Piano’ of 1937. However, government policy results are not negligible. This policy changed the structure of Italian production and market and created an artificial demand for aluminium, pushed by autarkic economic issues. Even if this augmentation was always presented by Montecatini as a great success for the company and for the economic policy of the country [93], there were some problems in this ‘state-driven’ development. The intention of the government was to have aluminium for its needs, like war material or cable for electricity transportation. These demands, however, were very uncertain and unstable: for producing aluminium, it was necessary to have a stable demand in order to plan the investment in hydroelectric power and a gradual amortization of these investments.

59In 1939 the aluminium companies started to worry about their position in the future: if on one hand they were exploiting the great demand for military uses, on the other hand they believed that it would be impossible to rely on these for ever [94]. This period of rapid investments had in fact proved detrimental to aluminium’s production price, furthermore the price fixed by the government rose faster. See the Table.3.4:

Table.3.4

Price of aluminium on Italian market, in Lira per kg, 1936-1 941

Year 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 Price / kg 9,25 9,60 11,00 11,50 12,00 12,70

Price of aluminium on Italian market, in Lira per kg, 1936-1 941

60This price, fixed by the Ministero delle Corporazioni, was rising, which can be attributed to two main causes. First, the Ministero taxed aluminium to finance the ‘Piano’ and further investments. Secondly, the ‘Piano’ had some problems with regard to electricity supply. The aluminium plants often lacked a regular supply of energy for production and the great output of aluminium envisaged by the plan required a continuous and regular energy supply. The old aluminium plants, based upon the use of surplus energy became over-sized in relation to the actual possibility of energetic supplies. This aspect broke aluminium’s economy of scale and reduced profits [95]. The structure of aluminium production became a concern for producers who understood that, after the rise in consumption driven by military programmes was over, they could not export or compete on the international market.

Conclusions

61The Italian aluminium industry was strongly connected to international cartel manoeuvring and international cartel agreements until 1934. Thereafter, other factors affected the development of this industry and the government policy became the most important factor in that development. Italian production was partially controlled by international companies such as AIAG, VAW and Alted, but the growth in production can be attributed to the government, which planned and financed expansions and studied alternative solutions for alumina production as the Blanc method (though ultimately unsuccessful). The lack of control over the international cartel was not the result of any kind of ‘appeasement’ policy by the cartel in regard of Italy’s Fascist regime but it was the consequence of the multinationals’ commercial strategy for Italy and the effect of the troubled relation between international companies and Montecatini, the biggest Italian chemical company. Italy changed from being an importing country to an exporting one because the international companies initially competed for the Italian market, thus causing overproduction. Subsequently, the European cartel also competed in Italy with Alcoa, aggravating overproduction and starting exports. Finally, when Alliance was created, all the reasons for having a non-restricted production in Italy ended, but the contracts obliged the cartel to take charge and rectify the Italian situation. The government, with its 1937 policy for production and autarky, was not completely effective: the production did not cover the fixed quotas and had high costs.

62The effects of international control over the Italian market varied during this period. In the first phase, cartel policy influenced the lack of production and the flow of imports. In the second phase, the cartel policy consented to allowing Italian production to develop, to produce and to export. As noted, this was the result of some complicated relations between Americans and Europeans and between Montecatini and international investors. At the same time, the cartel obtained that the Italian production stabilize its maximum production capacity, which remained at 12-13,000 t/a until 1935.

63After 1935, Italian production began growing, free from cartel obligations. This policy however, did not have the same result on all Italian companies. Montecatini reaped great profits and became the leading aluminium producer because of its proximity with political power. AIAG had also exploited the opportunities offered by the Italian economic situation of the Thirties even though it was a foreign company. In this case, its capacity to do business with an Italian entrepreneur was well accepted and the economic and politic milieux worked to the benefit of AIAG’s aims. Alted, indeed, had no chances for developing its investment, but the government did not stop its enlargement. It appears that Alted never requested anything from the government and in 1940 Borgofranco was confiscated after the declaration of war.

64The impact of government policy for aluminium was considerable. Autarky represented a good opportunity for companies to develop and enlarge plants and to find markets for increased production. However, these markets and these developments were not well balanced and created some productive problems and an expansion which was much too dependent on war demand.

65In conclusion, this article has stressed that for Italy it wasn’t the government that make the first step to emancipate Italian production from the international cartels, although it did play a part after the break had already taken place. The Italian government policy created demand which helped absorb production resulting from overestimated projections, and helped producers to compete in the international sphere by modifying custom duties. Thus, the « piano » policy represented a further phase of the aluminium industry’s development, one where the government developed new demands for aluminium oriented toward military needs.

66Returning to Marlio’s quotation at the head of the article, to invest in Italy by starting production there was not sufficient to ensure the success of business. The problems of market and consumption were the great issue for international investors because they risked an overproduction if the optimal size of investment was greater than demand levels. This overproduction could destabilise all international export markets through the selling off of surplus. All policies and strategies to develop consumption (compulsory substitution, development of war demand) created the situation for the consolidation of a « normal » and stable consumption. In the Italian case, the accent on strategic demand and the accumulation of a stockpile enabled the producers to escape from economic issues through the consolidation of a war-vitiated industry but did not completely solve the development problem of the aluminium industry.

Aluminium smelter and hydroelectric facilities of Mori, 1929. ARAP, 056-00-12347, Società italiana dell’alluminio, Lo stabilimento di Mori, Milano, 1929.